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Despite the normative importance of a clear party stance to political competition and representation, research has
discovered that parties and candidates tend to employ the “broad-appeal” strategy to becloud their true policy
intentions in order to expand their electoral support. Empirical work by Somer-Topcu demonstrates evidence that
being ambiguous indeed helps political parties gain votes in elections since equivocal messages make voters
underestimate the preference divergence between themselves and parties. In this article, we ask under what
conditions would the “broad-appeal” strategy fail to work? We then propose internal unity of political parties as a
critical condition for this strategy to work effectively. If a party is internally divided, conflict within the party
accentuates the true policy intentions of the party and then counterbalances the discounting effect of being ambiguous
on voters’ perceptions. Using survey data from the German Internet Panel, we show that voters underestimate policy
distances to ambiguous parties only if they perceive them as internally united. Using a two-stage estimator, we also
present evidence that the underestimation of policy distances affects voters’ vote choices.
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Motivation
When deciding on their policy messages, there is a list of
good reasons for political parties to posit themselves in a
“fog of ambiguity” (Downs, 1957: 136)—that is, to
embrace an ambiguous policy platform (Alesina and
Cukierman, 1990; Argones and Neeman, 2000; Bräuninger
and Giger, 2018; Glazer, 1990; Meirowitz, 2005; Rovny,
2012; Shepsle, 1972). In her recent work, Somer-Topcu
(2015) demonstrates that this “broad-appeal” strategy
makes voters underestimate the ideological distance
between themselves and political parties. In this article,
we explore the limits of this broad-appeal strategy and
argue that we need to distinguish between parties that delib-
erately hide their policy intentions without internally fight-
ing and those that internally fight over policies and are,
thus, perceived as ambiguous. We maintain that the
broad-appeal strategy loses its effectiveness when voters
perceive a party as internally fighting. This is because inter-
nal conflict accentuates the true intentions of different party
messages, and therefore voters can better locate the party
and estimate the policy distance between themselves and
the party (Hersh and Shaffner, 2013, see also Greene and
Haber, 2015).
Anecdotal evidence from two German parties illustrates
our argument. Björn Höcke, a well-known state-level par-
liamentarian of the right-populist party Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD), gave a speech challenging the consen-
sus in German society that perceives the Holocaust as cen-
tral to German post-WWII identity. While the moderate
faction within the party tried to suspend Höcke from the
party for taking right-wing extremist positions, the
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nationalist party faction blocked the suspension procedures
in a party board vote. The media covered this internal fight
broadly, including reports on both coparty chairpersons
taking opposing sides (Kamann, 2017).1 The month follow-
ing these internal fights, AfD’s support among voters
declined by 3 percentage points, that is, by one quarter.2
We attribute this to both nationalist and moderate AfD
supporters being afraid of the possibility that the party
could choose the “wrong” way.
At the same time, the German Social Democrats’ (SPD)
chairman announced that former European Parliament (EP)
President Martin Schulz would take over as SPD chairman
and run for Chancellor against Angela Merkel in the 2017
general election. All SPD party factions immediately
embraced this decision, and Schulz was elected as party
leader unanimously—which had never happened in more
than 150 years of the SPD history. Schulz had enjoyed an
excellent reputation in Germany as EP President; however,
his stances on domestic politics and especially whether he
would seek to bring change to SPD policy positions were
virtually unknown (Börnsen, 2017; Hickmann, 2017).
Moreover, this policy uncertainty received a significant
share of media attention. Nevertheless, in the following
month, polls revealed an increase of SPD vote intentions
by about 50%, virtually drawing level with Angela Mer-
kel’s Christian Democrats (Caspari, 2017). Even though
potential SPD and AfD voters were similarly clueless about
their parties’ future policy positions, SPD support increased
rapidly, whereas AfD support declined. We believe that the
fact that SPD factions did not present opposing policy pro-
posals publicly, while AfD factions did, played a major role
in attracting and turning away voters, respectively.
Based on this background, we argue that voters under-
estimate their policy distance to a party that embraces an
ambiguous policy platform, yet this only occurs when the
party is not perceived as internally fighting. This is because
perceived intraparty conflict improves voters’ estimation of
the policy distance between themselves and the party. Most
importantly, we contend that voters further adjust their
voting behavior after updating their beliefs of policy dis-
tance to the party with observed intraparty conflict. We
then empirically test our theory using survey data from the
German Internet Panel (GIP; Blom et al., 2015). Our
analyses reveal strong support for the above argument.
Specifically, we first show evidence that voters underesti-
mate the ideological distance between themselves and the
party with ambiguous policy position only when the party
is perceived as internally coherent. We then use a two-stage
estimator (Bergholt and Lujala, 2012) and present evidence
that intraparty coherence is a necessary condition for the
positive relationship between policy ambiguity and elec-
toral performance (Greene and Haber, 2015).
This study has important implications for several
research endeavors. The implications for parties’ electoral
strategies are that besides choosing a policy position
(Budge, 1994; Downs, 1957; Kedar, 2005; Laver, 2005;
Somer-Topcu, 2009; Wittman, 1973) and its level of ambi-
guity (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Argones and Nee-
man, 2000; Bräuninger and Giger, 2016; Glazer, 1990;
Shepsle, 1972), controlling party representatives to deliver
messages without being suggestive of intraparty fights is a
central challenge for party leaders. This, in turn, suggests a
new perspective on the debate on the value of intraparty
democracy (Teorell, 1999). Moreover, our results sketch a
route for future research to further scrutinize why intraparty
unity is a precious resource that parties seek particularly
before elections (Greene and Haber, 2015). In terms of
political representation, while the Responsible Party Model
(Mair, 2008) assumes that clear policy positions can link
parties to citizens, our findings challenge this relationship
and suggest that it only exists if voters perceive intraparty
conflict. Finally, this study also adds crucial evidence to the
debate on whether policy ambiguity pays off (Aldrich et al.,
2018; Somer-Topcu, 2015; Tomz and Van Houweling,
2009) by suggesting that party unity functions as a condi-
tioning factor. We discuss these contributions in more
detail in the final section of this article. We now turn to
our theoretical expectations and their empirical tests.
Theory
Electoral competition requires political parties to take posi-
tions in the policy space in order to respond to voters’
policy preferences (Downs, 1957). Strategies of position
taking may include proposing a very concrete policy plat-
form or being vague about what the party actually stands
for. Prior theoretical work contends that being ambiguous in
elections is a superior strategy as it helps parties gain elec-
toral support when future political environments are uncer-
tain, particularly when politicians are unsure about voters’
policy preferences (e.g. Alesina and Cukierman, 1990;
Argones and Neeeman, 2000; Argones and Postlewaite,
2002; Callander and Wilson, 2008; Glazer, 1990; Jensen,
2009; Shepsle, 1972). Empirical and experimental evidence
further reveals that presenting an ambiguous policy platform
is indeed electorally beneficial for political parties (Somer-
Topcu, 2015; Tomz and Van Houwelling, 2009), even
though some voters dislike vague policies (Bartels, 1986;
Enelow and Hinnich, 1981; Gill, 2005).
In her recent study using cross-country surveys, Somer-
Topcu (2015) is able to (partially) trace the causal mechan-
ism that makes voters more likely to vote for an ambiguous
party. She demonstrates that parties with an ambiguous
platform tend to perform better in elections since the strat-
egy significantly makes voters underestimate the actual
ideological distance between their own policy preferences
and the policy position of the ambiguous party. By sending
out mudded policy signals, political parties may appeal to
different electorates with diverse policy interests and con-
vince these voters that they are ideologically close to them.
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In this way, holding an ambiguous policy position seems to
be a great winning strategy, at least in the short run, for
political parties that aim to expand their electoral base.
However, the broad-appeal strategy can fail under cer-
tain circumstances (Somer-Topcu, 2015: 844). We argue
that an ambiguous policy position can evolve in two ways
and contend that the way in which it evolves determines
whether the strategy works or not. On the one hand, a party
can deliberately decide to send ambiguous policy signals,
for instance, by avoiding to take a clear stance at all, or by
highlighting different parts of its manifesto to different
subconstituencies without directly contradicting other party
messages or even downplaying internal policy differences
intentionally. This strategy may result in an ambiguous
policy position without intraparty fights. Martin Schulz’s
early 2017 election campaign is a good example of this
pattern. In the first weeks under Schulz’s leadership, SPD
policy was vague, and at the same time, there were no
internal fights. Voters (unknowingly) felt attracted by this
combination, and SPD vote shares in polls increased sig-
nificantly at the time.
On the other hand, a party can have an ambiguous policy
position because the party is internally fighting. When
party factions propose distinct policy proposals and pub-
licly criticize and fight against each other, the party plat-
form is also very likely to be perceived as ambiguous since
voters are confused about what exactly the party stands for.
Yet, voters clearly observe the conflict within the party and
receive clear-cut policy messages from party factions. The
debate on Höcke’s speech in early 2017 is an example of
this second, conflictual type of party policy ambiguity.
There were severe fights within the party, which made
voters puzzled about future party policy, and further led
to a significant drop in AfD support.
We argue that whether a party is perceived as internally
fighting or not is relevant to whether voters realize that the
policy messages they like about an ambiguous party are
foiled by the party’s second face. When the party is cohe-
sive, policy differences are not highlighted and voters are
likely to underestimate the policy distance between them-
selves and the party. When the party is internally fighting,
however, voters are made aware of policy differences
within the party and, therefore, do not misunderstand the
party’s true policy intentions. This also suggests that the
extent to which a party is ambiguous is not endogenous to
intraparty conflict. In fact, the survey data we use below
indicate that the correlation between these two variables is
only about 0.14.
Our argument can also be visualized through a simple
exercise of simulation. Consider a party with a unified
party leadership that is perfectly capable of controlling the
content of policy messages its agents send to voters. This
party is able to set up a level of policy ambiguity by having
its agents send a set of varying policy messages. Imagining
that every policy message can be placed on an 11-point
left-right scale, the left panel of Figure 1 shows the distri-
bution of messages that can evolve if this party expresses
an ambiguous policy position in 1000 policy messages. A
voter of this party should have difficulty to detect that some
of the party messages are not particularly desirable to her.
For instance, a voter whose policy preference locates at
point 3 on the scale may not realize that the message
designed for voters whose ideal point locates at 7 is so far
away from her ideal position as the party is coherently
hiding its policy intention and all party agents are deliber-
ately downplaying differences between party messages.
Now, consider another party with a divided party lead-
ership controlled by two party leaders. Each party leader
requests her agents to send messages that are intended to
promote their own policy interests within the party. We
depict this party in the right panel of Figure 1. The party
is internally divided between a light gray and a dark gray
faction and each of them sends 500 policy messages. Note
that in these cases, we designed the two arising distribu-
tions with identical ambiguity scores at 0.47.3 While these
two distributions are remarkably similar, voters of the
divided party clearly can observe the internal split and
different messages originated from the intraparty policy
disagreement if party agents are publicly fighting over pol-
icies and are not downplaying or hiding internal differ-
ences. This is because public fights reveal conflicting and
potentially contradictory aspects to a broad public that oth-
erwise only some voters would realize. Therefore, the same
voter at position 3 on the scale can easily observe those
messages that were designed for voters located at the right-
hand side of the spectrum (i.e. the light gray faction). Like-
wise, a voter at position 7 can also observe the messages
created by the dark gray fraction. In this case, we suggest
that voters are more likely to comprehend the opposing
content of party messages, and hence they are less likely
to believe that the party is close to them, which implies that
they are less likely to support this party.4
A similar link to the one we suggest between policy
conflict and voters’ awareness of party positions is also
evident in the recent literature on policymaking in coalition
governments. Specifically, since multiparty governance
blurs the policy profiles of coalition parties, voters may
have a hard time to tell coalition parties apart (Fortunato
and Stevenson, 2013; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Hence,
parties in coalitions tend to express their true policy inten-
tions through different tools such as floor speeches and
press releases (Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017; Martin and
Vanberg, 2008), particularly when policy disagreement
exists. Policy information embedded in these activities,
along with conflict, further helps voters pin down the true
policy position of coalition parties (Spoon and Klüver,
2017). The similarity to intraparty conflict is immediate.
Just as coalition conflict accentuates the difference of pol-
icy preferences between coalition parties and consequently
informs voters where these parties locate in the ideological
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landscape, conflict within a party highlights the policy
intentions of party factions and helps voters place the party
accordingly.5
To reiterate, we argue that the broad-appeal strategy (i.e.
being ambiguous) does not make voters underestimate the
ideological divergence between a party and their own pol-
icy interests when the party is perceived to be internally
divided. This is because intraparty conflict reveals the pur-
pose of different party policy messages (as well as the
party’s true position) and therefore offsets a voter’s mis-
calculation of the true ideological distance between the
party and his or her ideal position. On the contrary, if the
party is being unequivocal about its policy goals, its true
policy intention and policy position can be observed easily
by the electorate. In this case, party unity should impose no
effect on voters’ perceptions of the distance between their
own interests and the party’s position. Our hypotheses can
be formulated as:
Ambiguous party hypothesis: When a party is ambig-
uous in its policy platform, a voter’s perception of
the distance between the party and herself
decreases as the voter’s perceived unity of the
party increases.
Unambiguous party hypothesis: When a party is
unambiguous in its policy platform, a voter’s per-
ceived unity of the party has no effect on her
perception of the distance between the party and
herself.
Data and modeling strategy
To examine our argument, we require information on how
voters place themselves and political parties on an ideologi-
cal spectrum, and most importantly, their perception of the
extent to which a party is united or divided. We rely on
surveys conducted by the GIP (Blom et al., 2015), which is
a panel survey study based on a random sample of the Ger-
man population. Germany is an interesting country to test our
hypotheses because it provides variation in both party policy
ambiguity and party unity. At the same time, German parties
are fairly cohesive (e.g. in their parliamentary behavior)
which makes Germany a hard case to test our hypotheses
because voters have fewer clues to judge parties’ internal
unity. Thus, if our hypotheses find support in Germany, they
are likely to find support in other countries as well.6
In particular, we use data of four GIP waves from autumn
2012 to 2013, respectively (Blom et al., 2016a, 2016b,
2016c, 2016d).7 In the surveys, respondents were asked to
place the five major German parties and themselves on an
11-point left-right continuum. Also, respondents were asked
to rate party unity using an 11-point scale. These are the
major questions that we will use to generate our dependent
variable and the independent variables of interest.
Figure 1. Two distributions of 1000 party messages with identical agreement scores.
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Similar to Somer-Topcu (2015), our dependent variable
is the perceived distance between a respondent i and a party
k. It is measured as the absolute distance between respon-
dent i’s self-placement and her placement of party k. As a
result, each respondent i can enter the data k times for each
wave she answered and the unit of analysis is, therefore, the
respondent-party-wave. Also, as we will discuss below, our
data include several variables at both the respondent and
the party levels.
Our theory concerns the interaction between actual dis-
tance, party ambiguity, and perceived party unity. To mea-
sure the actual ideological distance between respondent i
and party k, we need information on the true policy position
of political parties. Unlike Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) surveys, the GIP survey does not include
expert evaluation of party positions. We, therefore, follow
Spoon and Klüver’s (2017) strategy by using the averaged
perception of all respondents as a proxy of actual party
positions.8 Thus, actual distance captures the distance
between each respondent i’s self-placement and the mean
of all respondents’ placements of party k.
To measure party ambiguity, we follow Somer-Topcu
(2015) by utilizing the perceptual agreement score devel-
oped by Van der Eijk (2001). We convert the variable so
that greater numbers indicate a lower consensus among
voters about a party’s ideological location.9 That is, greater
numbers show a higher level of party ambiguity. Since we
will be dealing with a three-way interaction term, for sim-
plicity, we create an indicator variable to capture the parties
that attempt to appeal broadly. Parties with values greater
than the mean value of the ambiguity score are assigned the
value 1 as ambiguous party, and 0 otherwise.10
Finally, to capture perceived party unity, we use the GIP
question that asks respondents to indicate their perception
of a party’s cohesiveness using an 11-point scale.11 This
variable essentially measures respondent i’s perceived
intraparty coherence of party k.
Econometrically, our model can be formulated as the
following:
½Perceived Distancei;k  ¼ b1  ½Actual Distancei;k 
þ b2  ½Ambiguous Party;k 
þ b3  ½Perceived Unity;k 
þ b4  ½Ambiguous Partyi;k  Actual Distancei;k 
þ b5  ½Ambiguous Partyi;k  Perceived Unityi;k 
þ b6  ½Actual Distancei;k  Perceived Unityi;k 
þ b7  ½Actual Distancei;k  Perceived Unityi;k
 Ambiguous Partyi;k 
þ b8  Controlsi;k
þ b0  Intercepts
Since we intend to test whether party unity is an impor-
tant mediator that conditions the effect of the broad-
appeal strategy suggested by Somer-Topcu (2015), we
follow her modeling strategy by including the same set of
control variables in our model. Specifically, we add a vector
of covariates that have been linked to respondents’ political
knowledge on parties’ ideological positions (e.g. Dahlberg,
2009; Somer-Topcu, 2015). At the individual level, we first
include a dummy variable that indicates whether respondent
i’s party identification is affiliated with party k. Supporters
of a party, according to the projection literature, tend to
assimilate the party’s ideological location to their own posi-
tion (e.g. Merrill et al., 2001). Therefore, we expect party
supporters to shorten the perceived distance between them-
selves and the party they support. Another individual level
variable considers the respondents’ education level as it
should be positively correlated with respondents’ ability to
map parties on the policy space.
At the party level, we include a dummy variable that
indicates whether a party is a single issue party.12 This is
because single issue parties engage in fewer issues than the
so-called “catch-all” parties and, most importantly, they
rarely compete on the traditional left-right dimension. Con-
sequently, voters may know less about the ideological pro-
file of these single issue parties. In addition, we also control
for a dummy variable that indicates government member-
ship13 and a variable that captures party vote shares at the
most recent general election. Government parties and par-
ties with a large share of seats are likely to receive greater
media attention, which makes voters better informed about
their policy positions. Finally, considering the nature of the
data structure—an observation for each combination of
respondents, parties, and waves—we estimate a multilevel
model with random intercepts at the party and the party-
wave level, as well as time fixed effects.14 Descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 1.
Empirical results
Table 2 shows the results of our statistical analysis.15 In
Model 1, we first perform a simple model with the variables
of our interest, and in Model 2, we estimate a full model




Perceived distance 2.444 2.095 0 10
Actual distance 2.168 1.614 0.078 9.088
Ambiguous party 0.617 0.486 0 1
Perceived unity 5.498 2.409 1 11
Party supporter 0.123 0.329 0 1
Education 4.615 1.232 1 6
Single issue party 0.18 0.384 0 1
In government 0.407 0.491 0 1
Vote share 19.217 8.741 10.7 33.8
Second wave 0.488 0.500 0 1
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including all control variables. A first glance suggests that
the results are fairly robust across models, although inter-
preting the three-way interaction effects is difficult by sim-
ply reading the coefficients. To better understand the
meaning of the estimated results and examine our hypoth-
eses properly, we follow the strategy suggested by King et al.
(2000) to simulate and plot the predicted values of the
dependent variable (i.e. perceived distance) using the esti-
mated parameters of the variables of interest in Model 2. The
predicted values of perceived distance are calculated by set-
ting whether a party is being an ambiguous party, allowing
perceived unity to range from its minimum to maximum
values, and holding other control variables at their mean
values. In the left panel of Figure 2, we present the situation
where a party has a concrete policy stance, while in the right
panel, we show the case where a party employs the broad-
appeal strategy. The white lines in the figure indicate the
point estimates of the predicted values while the gray areas
show the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
As one may immediately observe from the right panel,
when the party is equivocal about its policy platform, the
discounting effect of this “broad-appeal” strategy on a vot-
er’s perceived distance between the party and herself
declines significantly as the voter’s perception of the
party’s unity decreases. Respondents tend to believe that
an ambiguous party is ideologically closer to them when
the party is perceived to have a higher level of
cohesiveness, ceteris paribus. In line with our expectation,
perceived intraparty conflict exposes the actual ideological
divergence between the party and the voters. On the con-
trary, in the left panel where the party takes an unequivocal
stance, the story apparently works differently. When the
party has a concrete plan for its future policies, it helps
voters learn its true policy intentions and where it stands
in the policy space. As a result, our respondents have a very
clear idea of the actual distance between themselves and
the party, regardless of whether they perceive the party as
internally divided or not.
Comparing the two graphs in Figure 2 also reveals a
very interesting finding. When a party is perceived to be
coherent, the broad-appeal strategy works perfectly as
Somer-Topcu (2015) suggests. Respondents tend to per-
ceive the party ideologically closer to their own positions
when the party is ambiguous rather than concrete. For
instance, when the party’s unity is perceived to be at 9 on
the 11-point scale, a hypothetical voter perceives a policy
distance of 2.15 units between herself and the party when
the party embraces an ambiguous platform but sees a dis-
tance of 2.42 units when the party communicates a clear
policy program. This difference is statistically significant.
On the contrary, when the party is perceived to be intern-
ally divided, playing the broad-appeal strategy significantly
turns voters further away than keeping a crystal clear policy
platform does. When the party’s unity is perceived to be at
2, the hypothetical voter would observe a distance of 2.73
units if the party is equivocal, but only perceives a distance
of 2.48 units when the party is unambiguous. These find-
ings together suggest that, when the intraparty conflict
exists, a party may choose to stay clear rather than jumping
into a “fog of ambiguity” as the latter clearly alienates
potential voters. Overall, we take the above findings as
supportive evidence to our theoretical hypotheses.
The electoral consequence of ambiguity
while being internally divided
Up until now, we have demonstrated that the effect of the
“broad-appeal strategy” on voters’ perceived distance
between their own position and the perceived party position
is largely conditional on the extent to which a party is
perceived to be internally coherent. To recap, we find that
being ambiguous helps parties influence voter perceptions
in a favorable way (i.e. reduce the perceived distance) only
when the party is perceived to be internally unified and that
this effect declines as the perceived intraparty conflict esca-
lates. Our results imply that there should be an electoral
consequence of the interplay between party ambiguity and
party unity because (perceived) policy distance affects vote
choices (Downs, 1957). Voters should be more likely to
vote for a party when they feel close to it, that is, when the
party is equivocal about its policy platform and not intern-
ally fighting, and less likely to do so when the party
Table 2. The effect of party ambiguity and unity on voters’
perceived distance to the party.
Model 1 Model 2
Actual distance 0.969** (0.039) 0.962** (0.039)
Ambiguous party 0.655** (0.174) 0.506** (0.180)
Distance  Ambiguous
Party
0.060 (0.056) 0.050 (0.056)
Perceived party unity 0.007 (0.022) 0.013 (0.022)
Distance  Unity 0.006 (0.006) 0.010 (0.006)
Ambiguous PartyUnity 0.062* (0.028) 0.047y (0.028)
Distance  Ambiguous
Party Unity
0.010 (0.009) 0.012 (0.009)
Partisan supporter 0.716** (0.058)
Education 0.021 (0.015)
Single issue party 0.104 (0.071)
Government party 0.126* (0.059)
Vote share 0.000 (0.003)
Second wave 0.096y (0.048)
Constant 0.379** (0.141) 0.343* (0.163)
Random effect—Party 2.840** (0.610) 19.231y (8.805)
Random effect—Party
wave
3.445* (1.396) 20.201** (6.183)
Random effect—
Residual
0.405** (0.009) 0.393** (0.009)
Observations 6867 6867
Log likelihood 12528 12445
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; yp < 0.1.
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remains ambiguous yet its leaders fight publicly over future
policies. In this section, we provide an empirical test to
examine the above expectations.
To empirically explore how the electoral consequence
of the broad-appeal strategy is mediated by party unity, one
approach is to add an objective measure of party unity and
its interaction term with party ambiguity in the same party-
level model that Somer-Topcu (2015) performs in her
research. Unfortunately, this strategy is not feasible at the
moment as such a data set of party unity is not available. As
an alternative, we utilize our GIP survey to model respon-
dents’ voting behavior and investigate how their vote
choices are influenced by whether a party is ambiguous
and whether the party is perceived to be unified.
Note that our argument suggests that the effects of party
ambiguity and party unity on voting behavior are indirect.
These variables first affect one’s perception of the distance
between oneself and a focal party, as we have demonstrated,
and then the updated perceived distance determines whether
one would vote for the party or not. As a result, we do not
perform a model that simply regress respondents’ choices
against actual distance, party ambiguity, and party unity (as
well as their interaction terms). Rather, we explore the elec-
toral implications using a two-stage model (Bergholt and
Lujala, 2012). In the first stage, we conduct a full model
of respondents’ perceived distance (i.e. Model 2 in Table
2) in order to obtain the predicted perceived distance for
each respondent i and party k. We then use this predicted
distance as the major explanatory variable in a second-stage
model where the dependent variable is the respondent’s vote
choice from a set of parties.16 We use a conditional logit
model (McFadden, 1973) in the second stage to estimate the
impacts of perceived distance on respondents’ vote choice.
We then bootstrap this two-stage model 1000 times to
account for first-stage prediction uncertainty that feeds into
the second stage. Results are presented in Table 3.
Consistent with our expectation and the existing spatial
voting literature, voters’ perceptions of a party signifi-
cantly influence their willingness to vote for the party.
As one may observe, this finding is robust after taking
into account other covariates, including a strong predictor
of vote choice: party identification. Clearly, when the
perceived distance between a respondent i and a focal
party k increases, the probability for the respondent to
vote for the party decreases. Yet, this is not exactly our
Figure 2. The interaction effect of perceived unity and ambiguity on perceived distance.
Note: The white lines in the plot show the point estimates, and the gray areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3. The effect of party ambiguity and unity on voting
behavior.
Model 3 Model 4
Predicted perceived
Distance
0.966** (0.059) 0.478** (0.056)
Partisan voter 1.786** (0.141)
Single issue party 0.042 (0.189)
Government party 0.478** (0.115)
Vote share 0.044** (0.006)
Choices 762 762
Log likelihood 1243.4 1004.4
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; yp < 0.1.
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interest here as we are more concerned with how party
ambiguity and perceived party unity shape one’s vote
choice. Ideally, we would want to generate and plot pre-
dicted voting probabilities that are derived based on the
predicted values of perceived distance that varies at dif-
ferent levels of party unity and whether a party is being
ambiguous. Since we have already produced a set of the
values of predicted perceived distance (and plotted them
in Figure 2), now we simply take these values and employ
the estimated parameters from Model 3 to calculate the
predicted voting probabilities of vote choice. The final
results are visually illustrated in Figure 3.
Corresponding to Figure 2 above, in the right panel of
Figure 3, we plot the predicted voting probability based on
the predicted perceived distance in the scenario where a
party is advertising an ambiguous platform. In line with
our expectation, as greater values of perceived unity
shorten the perceived distance between voters and the
party, it simultaneously enhances the party’s profile and
makes voters more likely to vote for the party. In the left
panel of Figure 3, we plot the predicted voting probability
in the case where the party embraces a clear policy pro-
gram. Consistent with our expectation, the likelihood of
voters to vote for an unequivocal party is not affected by
perceived party unity. Also, comparing across panels, we
see that when the perceived party unity is high, the broad-
appeal strategy is more electorally beneficial than making
concrete policy plans. In fact, the probability of voting for
an internally united party increases by almost 50% when a
party is ambiguously about its policies than when it
embraces a clear stance. This, again, confirms our theore-
tical conjecture.
Conclusion
From a normative perspective, political parties in multi-
party systems should pursue the “product differentiation”
strategy by taking an unequivocal policy stance in order to
distinguish themselves from their competitors (APSA,
1950; Mair, 2008). Different from this normative perspec-
tive, a recent work by Somer-Topcu (2015) presents
strong evidence that “broad-appeal” seems to be a better
winning strategy, at least in the short term, because it
helps parties hide their true policy intentions, target a
wide range of voters with different preferences, and con-
vince voters that the party is ideologically close to them.
Most importantly, parties playing the ambiguous card
indeed perform better in elections than their competitors
who embrace the product-differentiation strategy (i.e. tak-
ing a concrete policy stance).
We add to these considerations the argument that intra-
party cohesiveness is a necessary precondition for the broad-
appeal strategy to work because internal fights make voters
realize that different policy positions within the party exist.
As a result, they are not led astray by vague policy messages.
We present empirical results that corroborate this argument.
When a party plays the broad-appeal strategy, the discount-
ing effect of ambiguity on one’s perceived distance between
self-placement and party location works exactly as Somer-
Topcu (2015) suggests when voters perceive a high unity in
Figure 3. The interaction of perceived unity and ambiguity on voting behavior.
Note: The white lines in the plot show the point estimates, and the gray areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
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the party. Yet, this effect drops significantly and even
reverses as voters’ perception of party unity decreases. Most
importantly, this conditional effect of party unity on voters’
perceptions is then perfectly translated into their voting
behavior. Being ambiguous makes voters more likely to vote
for the party; yet, this tendency is moderated when perceived
party unity declines.
There are limitations of the present research. The
empirical results we present in this study are based on Ger-
man parties only, which may raise a question on the gen-
eralizability of our findings. However, Germany is
certainly a hard test for our hypotheses because German
parties are fairly cohesive in their behavior. We thus expect
that voters in other countries should behave similarly or
react even stronger to intraparty fights. Another issue we
cannot address in this article is that respondents may inter-
pret the survey scales employed to locate parties’ policy
positions and their unity differently (i.e. the DIF issue).17
Unfortunately, regular methods to tackle this issue expli-
citly assume that policy positions are not ambiguous
(Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977: 112). Thus, further research
is needed to establish whether the DIF issue limits the
generalizability of our findings to other settings.
Our findings are of importance to our understanding of
parties’ electoral strategies, intraparty politics, and political
representation. First, besides corroborating Somer-Top-
cu’s (2015) findings using a different data set, we contrib-
ute to the literature that studies parties’ strategic usage of
ambiguous messages (e.g. Bräuninger and Giger, 2016;
Tomz and Van Houwelling, 2009). We challenge the
notion that voters are able to perceive the extent to which
a party is ambiguous, which is often an assumption
adopted in the theoretical literature (e.g. Argones and
Neeman, 2000; Callander and Wilson, 2008; Shepsle,
1972). We argue and find empirical support for the idea
that voters may be less aware of how precise party policy
positions are, an assumption that is likely to change the
conclusion drawn from many models that focus on ambig-
uous party positions.
Second, we begin to lay out the notion of how parties’
policy positions and the corresponding ambiguity evolve.18
Most models of policy ambiguity assume that parties can
set the level of policy ambiguity freely, just as they can
freely select a policy position (e.g. Shepsle, 1972). We, by
contrast, stress the role intraparty politics plays in party
ambiguity. Our results suggest that both a party’s policy
position and its ambiguity are products of collective colla-
boration among all party members or party factions. While
there are many circumstances in which parties seek the
same goal in a unified manner, there are certainly internal
fights that may distort the provision of a unified, strategi-
cally chosen policy position. As a consequence, future
research should study how competition within parties, say
between party factions (Ceron, 2012), affects party policy
positions and ambiguity.
Third, our results potentially provide a partial answer to
the debate on the electoral implications of embracing an
ambiguous platform. Specifically, while both Somer-
Topcu (2015) and Tomz and Van Houweling (2009)
suggest that being ambiguous is an electorally beneficial
strategy, recent work by Aldrich et al. (2018) finds evi-
dence that ambiguity actually leads to electoral penalties.
In this article, we show that party unity plays an important
role that conditions the electoral consequence of the broad-
appeal strategy. Parties are rewarded for doing so only
when they are internally coherent, while they are punished
for being ambiguous when they are internally divided.
Fourth, the results highlight why party unity is such a
precious resource in party politics (Greene and Haber,
2015). Simply put: Well-conducted campaigns that rely
on somewhat ambiguous policy statements (i.e. the
broad-appeal strategy) can be easily undermined by intra-
party conflicts. As a consequence, party leaders have
strong incentives to form a broad coalition within the
party to minimize the risk of party mavericks baffling
their plans (Cross and Blais, 2012). Moreover, they face
strong incentives to prohibit public debate within
the party. Finally, party factions that compete with one
another are likely to publicly announce their policy posi-
tion hoping that other party factions will embrace that
position for the sake of party coherence.
Fifth, the implications mentioned above challenge the
links between citizens and parties in political representa-
tion. Most prominently, the Responsible Party Model of
political representation is based on the assumption that
parties take clear, distinct policy positions that voters use
to make vote choices. While clear party stance educates
citizens about how parties represent their interests (Mair,
2008), our findings suggest that parties are likely to blur
their policy positions in order to gain votes. As a conse-
quence, many voters are likely to misperceive which party
reflects their preferences best, and hence, the connection
between voters’ preferences and government policy is
likely to be weakened or even broken.
A final aspect of political representation that is chal-
lenged by our findings is deliberation within political par-
ties. As Teorell (1999) argues, parties ought to be internally
democratic—that is, to be equivocal—to allow citizens’
needs to be put on the agenda. Our results, however, indi-
cate that parties face clear incentives to appear internally
united, that is, to not publicly fight about policies. In other
words, our results suggest that parties face a trade-off
between democratic representation on the one hand and
electoral success on the other hand.
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Notes
1. A couple of weeks later, the federal party board did institute
the suspension procedure. Again, however, the coparty chair-
persons took opposing sides. Furthermore, party expulsion
can only be mandated by intraparty courts whose positions
are virtually unknown. So uncertainty about which way party
policy would develop remained high (Polke-Majewski,
2017).
2. All major German polling companies reported this effect. For
an overview of polls, see http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/
index.htm.
3. It is measured by the perceptual agreement score, which is
used in Somer-Topcu (2015) as a proxy of the extent to which
a party is ambiguous.
4. Besides substantial fights between party factions (Ceron,
2012), there are ample other ways in which voters can update
their perceptions of party division. These include battles of
words at party conferences (Greene and Haber, 2015), cam-
paigns for party leadership selection (Kenig, 2009), speeches
in parliament (Porksch and Slapin, 2015), experience in gov-
ernment (Greene and Haber, 2015), internal party rules
(Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013), and many other
factors. Future research will determine to what extent voters
update their beliefs about intraparty conflict and party ambi-
guity from these sources (Adams et al., 2011, 2014).
5. Admittedly, parties in a coalition government have an incen-
tive to reveal their true positions through conflicts to voters,
while factions within a political party need not share the same
motivation. Yet, they may use public channels (e.g. the
media) to signal their policy positions to their faction
supporters.
6. The parties included in the sample are CDU/CSU, SPD,
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP, and Die Linke.
7. In both years, respondents were asked for party placements
and self-placements in September, whereas party cohesive-
ness was measured in November. Even though respondents in
November were asked to rate party cohesiveness thinking of
the last 4 weeks, more recent GIP data indicates that respon-
dents do not give different answers when no time span is
mentioned.
8. The lack of a “correct” party measurement is certainly a
limiting factor of our research design. We note, however, that
respondents’ mean belief about the party position should be a
reliable proxy unless misperceptions are positively correlated
(see Lehrer et al., Forthcoming). While it is certainly beyond
the scope of this article to investigate this, we call for future
research to scrutinize the potential differences between objec-
tive and perceived party positions as well as party ambiguity.
9. Theoretically, the perceptual agreement score ranges from
1 to 1. We rescaled it to the [0, 1] interval. In our data set,
it ranges between 0.09 and 0.27.
10. Treating ambiguity as a continuous variable in our model
yields very similar findings. The estimated results are
reported in the Online Appendix.
11. The question reads: “Members of the same party sometimes
express opposing views. When you recall the last four weeks,
do you perceive the following party as fragmented or as
cohesive.”
12. We consider Die Linke as single issue party, and all other
parties as multiple issue parties.
13. In the period of our surveys cover, CDU/CSU and SPD were
the incumbent parties.
14. In the Online Appendix Table A3, we further show that add-
ing respondent-specific fixed effects does not alter the con-
clusion drawn here.
15. Using the GIP survey, we successfully replicate Somer-Top-
cu’s (2015) model and reproduce very similar findings. Being
able to recover Somer-Topcu’s findings using the GIP data is
no doubt an important step. It helps us rule out the possibility
that the differences we reveal after taking into account party
unity might be artifacts of the data. The corresponding results
are presented in the Online Appendix A.
16. The data structure in the second stage model is identical to the
structure in the first stage model.
17. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
18. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this
out to us.
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Datenarchiv. ZA5867 Datenfile Version 2.0.0. DOI:10.4232/
1.12608
Blom AG, Bossert D and Gebhard F, et al; SFB 884 “Political
Economy of Reforms” Universität Mannheim (2016c) Ger-
man Internet Panel, Welle 7 - Core Study (September 2013).
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